Charlie Dreifus’s Timeless Lessons in an Untimely Market —Royce
article 11-26-2024

Charlie Dreifus’s Timeless Lessons in an Untimely Market

Portfolio Manager Charlie Dreifus discusses his distinctive investment approach and updates investors on his outlook for the Royce Small-Cap Special Equity Strategy.

TELL US
WHAT YOU
THINK

How do you describe your investment approach in the Small-Cap Special Equity Strategy?

Together with the Strategy’s assistant portfolio managers, Steven McBoyle and Tim Hipskind, I try to combine classic value analysis, the identification of good businesses, and accounting cynicism in our approach. These three tenets have their respective roots in the investment and accounting lessons of Ben Graham, Warren Buffett, and Abe Briloff. Abe was particularly important to my development as an investor. He was a mentor to me when I went to graduate school for Accounting. He’s best known, however, for his writings—he wrote several important books, as well as pieces for Barron’s during the 1970s, ‘80s, and ‘90s—that evaluated accounting principles and practices, especially the items that appear on the balance sheet and income statement.

How did Abe Briloff’s teachings help you develop your own distinctive style?

Abe showed me how critical it is to understand the numbers, which had always fascinated me. He showed me why it was important to perform very close analysis of financial statements; to study the footnotes because they so often reveal what the company is doing—or not doing. He taught me to question why companies show revenues and/or treat expenses the way they do. Today, this is known as governance, but at the time—this would be in the late 1960s and early 1970s—Abe thought of it as ‘accountable accounting,’ or, in some cases ‘unaccountable accounting, which is also the title of a book he wrote in 1972 (and coincidentally the same year Royce was founded).

“In the short run, I suspect that we’re headed towards higher levels of market volatility than we have recently seen. Perhaps then investors will look at both returns and the volatility experienced in achieving them.”
—Charlie Dreifus

I often say that a deep understanding of accounting principles gives us a chance to uncover the veracity of a company’s finances through our scrutiny of financial reports. Steven, Tim, and I spend a lot of time going over the numbers. Ultimately, we want companies that use conservative accounting procedures with management teams that have demonstrated their commitment to enhancing stockholders’ wealth. This is a discipline that we expect should benefit our investors over the long run because most portfolio managers are not doing similar deep dives into a company’s numbers, specifically not with the accounting background the three of us share.

How did you get your start as an investor?

My parents had a cousin who was a waiter, a very savvy guy who bought stocks for the dividends because they had higher yields than what was available at the bank in the early 1950s. This piqued my interest, especially because I was already interested in numbers of any kind. Later, when I received money for my bar mitzvah, I began buying stocks as a teenager. In fact, when I was in high school in Brooklyn, I would give the guidance counselor stock tips and he’d give me a hall pass in return. This gave me the chance to go and use a public telephone to call my broker. So, I was sort of a 16-year old day trader. Around this same time, I discovered the Moody’s manuals at the library, where I found companies whose stock prices weren’t in the newspaper. Studying those manuals gave me my first experience finding companies that were overlooked or mispriced.

Is finding mispriced companies still central to your approach?

Absolutely. Of course, the process of finding and analyzing companies has changed a great deal since those days. It’s harder to find inefficiencies and anomalies, although it’s relatively easier in small-cap because there are still companies that don’t have analyst coverage. Roughly 15% of the companies in the Russell 2000 Value and more than 13% of those in the Russell 2000 had little or no analyst coverage at the end of September. And in the mutual fund that we manage in the Strategy, Royce Small-Cap Special Equity Fund, almost 47% of the stocks had no more than a single analyst covering them at the end of the third quarter. So, we dig a little deeper than we used to, but we’re patient and are more than willing to do the necessary work to find what we think are attractively undervalued, mispriced small-cap companies.

Can you describe the importance of absolute value as a valuation pillar to your Strategy?

Although we work in a relative world, we operate with an absolute value mindset when selecting stocks. Our goal is an above-average risk-adjusted return with less volatility than our benchmark, the Russell 2000 Value Index. One of the key elements in trying to attain this goal is our focus on absolute value, which we define as a positive economic spread for a company. We search for companies that have a cap rate (conservatively defined as the lower of trailing or forward operating income over enterprise value) reasonably higher than the cost of financing as if we were acquiring the entire company. This spread creates economic value. Our absolute valuation approach creates a powerful, self-governing mechanism in that the spread determines our activities buying and selling stocks, along with the resulting cash position. One example of how this absolute value approach worked in the past was how we built a cash position through the first three quarter of 2018 and then, in the fourth quarter, the mechanism signaled that we should invest heavily. We had a similar dynamic in early 2020, when the pandemic caused absolute value to return to the market.

What is your outlook?

I'm in the minority here at Royce, but I don’t see the current moment as an opportune time to buy stocks, though there undoubtedly will be at some point. In the short run, I suspect that we’re headed towards higher levels of market volatility than we have recently seen. Perhaps then investors will look at both returns and the volatility experienced in achieving them. Should they do so, we believe Special Equity will prove worthy of their consideration. We continue to believe that our investment approach, which I have been steadfastly applying for 44 years, can provide rewarding returns with lower volatility over the long term, despite periods when our performance lags. In the current environment, our self-governing mechanism has led us to a higher cash position, which we look forward to putting to work when opportunities arrive.

Important Disclosure Information

Average Annual Total Returns as of 9/30/2024 (%)

  QTD1 1YR 3YR 5YR 10YR SINCE
INCEPT.
DATE ANNUAL
OPERATING EXPENSES
NET               GROSS
Small-Cap Special Equity 4.82 12.57 5.82 9.12 7.07 8.50 05/01/98  1.22  1.22
Russell 2000 Value
10.15 25.88 3.77 9.29 8.22 7.82 N/A  N/A  N/A
Russell 2000
9.27 26.76 1.84 9.39 8.78 7.37 N/A  N/A  N/A
1 Not annualized.

All performance information reflects past performance, is presented on a total return basis, reflects the reinvestment of distributions, and does not reflect the deduction of taxes that a shareholder would pay on fund distributions or the redemption of fund shares. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. Investment return and principal value of an investment will fluctuate, so that shares may be worth more or less than their original cost when redeemed. Shares redeemed within 30 days of purchase may be subject to a 1% redemption fee, payable to the Fund, which is not reflected in the performance shown above; if it were, performance would be lower. Current month-end performance may be higher or lower than performance quoted and may be obtained at www.royceinvest.com. Operating expenses reflect the Fund's total annual operating expenses for the Investment Class as of the Fund's most current prospectus and include management fees and other expenses.

Mr. Dreifus’s thoughts and opinions concerning the stock market are solely his own and, of course, there can be no assurance with regard to future market movements. No assurance can be given that the past performance trends as outlined above will continue in the future.

The performance data and trends outlined in this presentation are presented for illustrative purposes only. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. Historical market trends are not necessarily indicative of future market movements.

Sector weightings are determined using the Global Industry Classification Standard ("GICS"). GICS was developed by, and is the exclusive property of, Standard & Poor's Financial Services LLC ("S&P") and MSCI Inc. ("MSCI"). GICS is the trademark of S&P and MSCI. "Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS)" and "GICS Direct" are service marks of S&P and MSCI.

Frank Russell Company (“Russell”) is the source and owner of the trademarks, service marks and copyrights related to the Russell Indexes. Russell® is a trademark of Frank Russell Company. Neither Russell nor its licensors accept any liability for any errors or omissions in the Russell Indexes and/or Russell ratings or underlying data and no party may rely on any Russell Indexes and/or Russell ratings and/or underlying data contained in this communication. No further distribution of Russell Data is permitted without Russell’s express written consent. Russell does not promote, sponsor or endorse the content of this communication. The Russell 2000 Value and Growth indices consist of the respective value and growth stocks within the Russell 2000 as determined by Russell Investments. The Russell 2000 is an unmanaged, capitalization-weighted index of domestic small-cap stocks. It measures the performance of the 2,000 smallest publicly traded U.S. companies in the Russell 3000 index. The performance of an index does not represent exactly any particular investment, as you cannot invest directly in an index.

This material is not authorized for distribution unless preceded or accompanied by a current prospectus. Please read the prospectus carefully before investing or sending money. The Fund invests primarily in small-cap stocks which may involve considerably more risk than investing in larger-cap stocks. (Please see "Primary Risks for Fund Investors" in the prospectus.) As of 3/31/24, the Fund invested a significant portion of its assets in a limited number of stocks, which may involve considerably more risk than more broadly diversified portfolio because a decline in the value of any one of these stocks would cause the Fund's overall value to decline to a greater degree. (Please see "Primary Risks for Fund Investors" in the prospectus.)

Share:

Subscribe:

Sign Up

Follow: