Royce Small-Cap Total Return Fund Manager Commentary
article 08-04-2026

Royce Small-Cap Total Return Fund Manager Commentary

We believe the years ahead should handsomely reward active managers who can maintain their discipline. In fact, despite the small-cap indexes hovering around all-time highs, we continue to see an abundance of opportunity—which is unusual when markets are making new highs.

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Fund Performance

Royce Small-Cap Total Return Fund rose 13.7% for the year-to-date period ended 6/30/26 versus a gain of 23.0% for its small-cap benchmark, the Russell 2000 Value Index, for the same period. The Fund’s average annual total return since inception (12/15/93) was 10.3%.

What Worked… And What Didn’t

Seven of the Fund’s nine equity sectors finished the first half of 2026 in the black. Industrials and Financials had the biggest positive effects by a wide margin followed by Materials. Information Technology and Communication Services detracted, though the losses were comparatiVely marginal. At the industry level, semiconductors & semiconductor equipment (Information Technology), banks (capital markets), and chemicals (Materials) contributed the most while the top detractors were IT services (Information Technology), hotels, restaurants & leisure (Consumer Discretionary), and electronic equipment, instruments & components (Information Technology).

The Fund’s top contributor at the position level was Kulicke & Soffa, which has a majority share in the ball bonder equipment that’s used in the back-end packaging portion of semiconductor manufacturing. This market had been in an extended cyclical trough for several years, and we began to see substantive signs of a new upcycle that drove Kulicke’s shares meaningfully higher in the first half of 2026. Although the ball bonder market mostly serves the lower-priced, high volume end of the semiconductor market, the company is making great strides into developing new products for the advanced packaging market, and management has said that they are beginning to gain serious traction with customers in this new area, which both provides exposure to more secular growth areas and gets them more closely involved in the AI ecosystem. This success was another driver of the strong performance in the shares.

Advance Auto Parts is an aftermarket auto parts retailer that serves both professional installers and do-it-yourself customers with 4,300 stores in the U.S. and Canada. The company has benefited from two major automotive trends: with new car prices being close to $50,000, consumers are holding onto older cars—the average age is currently at an all-time-high of 13 years, and cars are growing significantly more complex, which drives demand for professional repair (“pro”) versus do-it-yourself (“DIY”). These trends were both evident in Advance’s fundamentals in the last quarter, with comparable store sales and operating margin significantly exceeding consensus estimates despite low-end consumers being pressured by higher gas prices. Importantly, Advance’s strong performance in the critical pro channel offered tangible evidence that the company’s turnaround is progressing, while 2026 operating margin guidance of 3.8% to 4.5% represents year-over-year improvement and incremental progress toward the 7.0% goal by 2028.

Element Solutions produces specialty chemicals and serves the Electronics and Industrials end markets. The former is the company’s primary end market, accounting for more than two-thirds of revenues. Element’s chemicals are critical to the products they go into (e.g., printed circuit boards) but are a small fraction of the end product’s total cost. As such, the company has strong pricing power. Its revenues are generally driven by its customers plant utilization rates, which have been increasing. While Element is exposed to many growth drivers in the technology market, the biggest one of late has been AI. Strong growth, margin expansion, and an undemanding multiple to start 2026 have led the stock to robust returns so far this year. (In early July, Element announced it would combine with competitor Solstice in a cash and stock transaction, highlighting the value of its underlying specialty chemical franchise.

The Timken Company is a diversified industrial business that makes highly engineered bearings and industrial motion systems. Timken is benefiting from a recovery in the U.S. industrial cycle, with three consecutive quarters of organic revenue growth, as well as idiosyncratic self-help margin improvements. In addition, the company held an Investor Day during the second quarter of 2026 which outlined attractive longer-term financial targets that were well received by the market.

MSC Industrial Direct Cl. A is an industrial distributor that has developed a specialty around metalworking tools and is therefore more heavily exposed to heavy manufacturing. MSC has long enjoyed a strong reputation for expertise in the metalworking space and have consistently provided good value to customers through that expertise. However, the company had also struggled to consistently drive strong returns on capital from the value it creates for clients. Under a new CEO, MSC has been going through significant and wide-ranging changes that span from their go-to-market strategy all the way to implementing distribution center best practices. As a result of these efforts, the company is starting to demonstrate tangible, positive benefits. Coupled with green shoots pointing to an upturn in the industrial cycle, the shares outperformed in the year’s first half.

The Hackett Group, an IT services company that provides a broad range of offerings, from research advisory to implementation services, was the position that detracted most in the first half of 2026. In addition to having strong consulting type services, the company has also been able to develop a unique data set that is based on their years of experience doing benchmarking and performance studies for the Global 2000. The company is going through a pivotal moment where they are turning this data set into a differentiated offering that helps both customers and internal consultants identify and implement agentic AI workflows. The weakness in the shares has been driven by some weakness in their traditional consulting practices, but mostly by the market’s perception that HCKT will be negatively disrupted by AI. The weakness in shares have been mostly driven by multiple compression, rather than any meaningful change to the fundamental outlook of the financials. We think that the market is getting this completely wrong, as we think that the company is uniquely positioned to understand complete end-to-end business process work flows, and can turn that knowledge into agentic AI implementation revenues.

Kyndryl Holdings is the world’s largest IT infrastructure services provider, offering mission-critical IT services to over 2,000 large-scale enterprises in 60 countries. Kyndryl was spun-off by IBM late in 2021, which enabled the newly independent company to pursue a profitable future by implementing a “AAA” strategy comprised of Accounts (restoring profitability to roughly 40% of accounts); Alliances (to enable customers access to the public clouds offered by Google, Microsoft, and Amazon; and Advanced Delivery (deploying automated tools to significantly improve service delivery/reduce costs), which made strategic sense. Our initial investment proved successful. We first bought shares in the summer of 2022 at an average cost of about $13 per share, and the stock appreciated to $43 by June 2025 as revenue, profits, and cash flow increased significantly despite an overall post-Covid slump in the IT industry.

During fiscal 1Q26 and 2Q26 (the quarters ended, respectively, in June and September 2025), Kyndryl reverted to revenue declines as contract signings slowed. The company then affirmed guidance for +1% revenue growth in fiscal 2026 in hopes of making up the revenue shortfall. In February 2026, however, Kyndryl reported results for fiscal 3Q26 in which revenue growth was flat, and fiscal 2026 guidance was lowered significantly. Management also reported that they would be unable to file their 10-Q on time—and that the CFO and General Counsel had departed while the Controller was reassigned amid a voluntary document request from the SEC regarding the company’s cash management practices. Kyndryl’s disclosures led us to believe that the company may have been boosting profitability and cash flow during certain periods by incentivizing vendors to delay submitting invoices. Our investment thesis looked at the appeal of the essential nature of Kyndryl’s products, its improving business fundamentals and execution, and an inexpensive valuation relative to $1 billion of projected free cash flow generation by fiscal 2028. The lessons learned from this investment are to exit a stock when the original thesis has played out while cracks seem to appear in execution.

CBIZ is a professional services firm that offers accounting and tax advisory services. The company has a long history of successfully rolling up the industry, acquiring sub-scale players and using that to build out its capabilities and expand its geographic reach. In late 2024 CBIZ did a much more sizeable acquisition of a competitor, Marcum, which catapulted the combined entity into the top-10 accounting firm ranks. The move gives them essential scale and resources to invest in technology and subject matter expertise. Starting in February of 2026, the market took the view that AI would decimate all professional services business models, essentially betting that the technology would soon be able to complete nearly all white collar work—which drove the weakness in CBIZ’s shares. Through our own extensive research of the ecosystem, we take the opposite view and think that the company’s ability to invest in these areas should allow them to thrive and take share in the AI era.

Brightstar Lottery is the number one technology provider for land-based or retail lottery systems. Brightstar also offers instant scratch-off ticket printing and digital lottery solutions for both draw-based games like Pick3, Keno, Powerball, Mega Millions, and instant games. Brightstar is the systems provider for 26 out of 46 lottery jurisdictions in the U.S., and seven of the world’s 10 largest lotteries. The company also operates the Italian Lotto and instant games (one of the world’s largest lotteries). The lottery business is modestly cyclical since it is viewed as an inexpensive form of entertainment woven into many people’s daily routines and is an important source of revenue for governments. Its shares have underperformed so far in 2026 due to market fears around slowed consumer spending, weak performance of multi-state jackpots, and subdued free cash flow generation until 2028 (due to upfront contract payments). We have reduced our position size to reflect the near-term negative free cash flow and the back-end loaded 2026 guidance.

Vontier Corporation is an industrial company that primarily serves the convenience store (“C-store”) industry, with products that range from gasoline dispensers to underground sensors that monitor the tanks to software inside the store whose capabilities include helping with managing inventory, marketing, and loyalty programs. Its share price performance was somewhat puzzling, as the company reported a solid first quarter, as well as solid full year guidance. 2026 EPS estimates from the end of 1Q26 through the end of June were essentially flat (down -0.6%). Thus, the stock’s underperformance during the quarter was entirely a function of multiple contraction, as the P/E multiple went from 10x to roughly 8.5x, a contraction of -15%. Our long-term views on Vontier remain bullish, and we see the current valuation as compelling both on an absolute basis and relative to the quality of the business and to its peers that trade at meaningfully higher multiples despite significant overlap in the underlying businesses.

The Fund’s disadvantage versus the Russell 2000 Value in the year’s first half was mostly attributable to stock selection. At the sector level, stock selection and, to a lesser extent, our overweight in Information Technology hurt relative results the most, in large part because we had far more limited exposure to the AI-related stocks that led the index’s advance. Four of the top 10 contributing industries in the Russell 2000 Value were in Information Technology. We were underweight in semiconductors & semiconductor equipment and electronic equipment, instruments & components and had no exposure to software or communications equipment. The combination of stock selection and portfolio overweights detracted in Consumer Staples and Financials. Conversely, stock selection in Materials and a lack of exposure to Utilities and Real Estate (both of which underperformed in the index) helped relative results the most.


Top Contributors to Performance Year-to-Date Through 6/30/261

Kulicke & Soffa Industries
Advance Auto Parts
Element Solutions
Timken Company (The)
MSC Industrial Direct Cl. A

1 Includes dividends

Top Detractors from Performance Year-to-Date Through 6/30/262

Hackett Group (The)
Kyndryl Holdings
CBIZ
Brightstar Lottery
Vontier Corporation

2 Net of dividends

Current Positioning and Outlook

Starting in early June, the market narrative on AI, including semiconductors, memory, data centers, etc., began to shift, with our relative performance following almost in lockstep. The once unyieldingly positive story of the AI secular wave started to show cracks, along with doubts about the models’ costs and efficacy. Coupled with extraordinary results in the year’s first half, some of these leaders began to experience weakness. More importantly for the Fund, the market began to broaden. For example, our insurance stocks, which had seemingly been left for dead for over a year (despite solid fundamentals), were up 9.5% in June. Put simply, we saw a rotation out of high beta tech into unsexy but profitable and cash generative businesses trading at attractive multiples (our sweet spot as quality focused value investors). We have been on the other side of this market regime since the April 2025 bottom, so we welcomed this shift. While our contrarian bias is to believe that we are in some type of bubble—be it in stocks and/or in the amount of CapEx dollars being spent with returns that are unlikely to justify the investment—we will only know for sure with the benefit of hindsight. We liken this environment to a game of tug of war, with the AI tech trade and the old economy cash generative businesses each pulling in opposite directions. We do not believe there will be a smooth handoff from the former to the latter. However, we also believe that we are getting a preview of what will happen if and when the old economy stocks begin to outperform. Our disciplined process has repeatedly taken us to parts of the market that have lagged and are largely outside the AI ecosystem—and our relative performance has suffered greatly as a result. However, we will continue to follow this process, as we know that capital spending cycles of this magnitude are rare (occurring perhaps once every 25 years or so). We believe that when the cycle turns, our discipline will once again be rewarded.

We have been trying to think of a metaphor that might best describe what’s happening. Think of small-caps as a tree that bears fruit, has been growing for some time, and is beginning to bear fruit (small-caps are handily beating large-caps, the Nasdaq and the Magnificent 7 over the last 12+ months). During this period, there was ample low-hanging fruit, and even quite a bit that fell to the ground. This describes the rally from April of 2025 to the end of June 2026, or, said differently, beta. From our vantage point, there isn’t much of this fruit left. But further up the tree, there remains an abundance of juicy, ripe, high-quality fruit. The small-cap leadership cycle is far from over, in our opinion. However, to get to that fruit, one must know how to adeptly climb the tree, using strong branches for support and avoiding the weaker branches. Active managers tend to be good at climbing trees. We think that our team can climb this tree; we have done it many times and have a process for doing so. We also possess deep knowledge of the tree that we believe we can allow us to provide fruit (alpha) to our investors that can allow them to continue to benefit from an emerging small-cap cycle. We believe the years ahead should handsomely reward active managers who can maintain their discipline. In fact, despite the small-cap indexes hovering around all-time highs, we continue to see an abundance of opportunity—which is unusual when markets are making new highs. This fruitful opportunity set (pun very much intended), coupled with the recent shifts that have occurred in the market regime, gives us great optimism about the years ahead.

Average Annual Total Returns Through 06/30/26 (%)

QTR1 YTD1 1YR 3YR 5YR 10YR 15YR 20YR 25YR 30YR SINCE INCEPT.
(12/15/93)
Small-Cap Total Return 14.8413.6920.5813.427.689.879.138.008.709.6510.28
Russell 2000 Value 17.1922.9943.0118.738.2310.899.977.988.999.7210.02
Russell 2000 21.4922.5740.7818.606.9811.6210.528.888.808.939.43

Annual Operating Expenses: 1.23

1 Not annualized.

Important Performance, Expense and Disclosure Information

Important Performance and Expense Information

All performance information reflects past performance, is presented on a total return basis, reflects the reinvestment of distributions, and does not reflect the deduction of taxes that a shareholder would pay on fund distributions or the redemption of fund shares. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. Investment return and principal value of an investment will fluctuate, so that shares may be worth more or less than their original cost when redeemed. Current month-end performance may be higher or lower than performance quoted and may be obtained at www.royceinvest.com. Operating expenses reflect the Fund's total annual operating expenses for the Investment Class as of the Fund's most current prospectus and include management fees, other expenses, and acquired fund fees and expenses. Acquired fund fees and expenses reflect the estimated amount of the fees and expenses incurred indirectly by the Fund through its investments in mutual funds and other investment companies.

Current month-end performance may be obtained at our Prices and Performance page.

Notes to Performance and Other Important Information

The thoughts expressed in this report concerning recent market movements and future prospects for small company stocks are solely the opinion of Royce at June 30, 2026, and, of course, historical market trends are not necessarily indicative of future market movements. Statements regarding the future prospects for particular securities held in the Funds’ portfolios and Royce’s investment intentions with respect to those securities reflect Royce’s opinions as of June 30, 2026 and are subject to change at any time without notice. There can be no assurance that securities mentioned in this report will be included in any Royce-managed portfolio in the future.


As of 6/30/26, the percentage of Fund assets was as follows: Kulicke & Soffa Industries was 1.5%, Advance Auto Parts was 2.8%, Element Solutions was 1.8%, Timken Company (The) was 1.8%, MSC Industrial Direct Cl. A was 3.0%, Hackett Group (The) was 1.9%, Kyndryl Holdings was 0.0%, CBIZ was 1.6%, Brightstar Lottery was 0.1%, Vontier Corporation was 1.8%.


Sector weightings are determined using the Global Industry Classification Standard (“GICS”). GICS was developed by, and is the exclusive property of, Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC (“S&P”) and MSCI Inc. (“MSCI”). GICS is the trademark of S&P and MSCI. “Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS)” and “GICS Direct” are service marks of S&P and MSCI.

All indexes referred to are unmanaged and capitalization weighted. Each index’s returns include net reinvested dividends and/or interest income. Russell Company (“Russell”) is the source and owner of the trademarks, service marks and copyrights related to the Russell Indexes. Russell® is a trademark of Frank Russell Company. Neither Russell nor its licensors accept any liability for any errors or omissions in the Russell Indexes and/or Russell ratings or underlying data and no party may rely on any Russell Indexes and/or Russell ratings and/or underlying data contained in this communication. No further distribution of Russell Data is permitted without Russell’s express written consent. Russell does not promote, sponsor or endorse the content of this communication. The Russell 2000 Index is an index of domestic small-cap stocks. It measures the performance of the 2,000 smallest publicly traded U.S. companies in the Russell 3000 Index. The Russell 2000 Value and Growth Indexes consist of the respective value and growth stocks within the Russell 2000 as determined by Russell Investments. The Russell Microcap Index includes 1,000 of the smallest securities in the Russell 2000 Index, along with the next smallest eligible securities as determined by Russell. The Russell 2500 is an unmanaged, capitalization-weighted index of the 2,500 smallest publicly traded U.S. companies in the Russell 3000 index. The returns for the Russell 2500-Financial Sector represent those of the financial services companies within the Russell 2500 index. Source: MSCI. MSCI makes no express or implied warranties or representations and shall have no liability whatsoever with respect to any MSCI data contained herein. The MSCI data may not be further redistributed or used as a basis for other indexes or any securities or financial products. This report is not approved, endorsed, reviewed or produced by MSCI. None of the MSCI data is intended to constitute investment advice or a recommendation to make (or refrain from making) any kind of investment decision and may not be relied on as such. The MSCI ACWI Small Cap Index is an unmanaged, capitalization-weighted index of global small-cap stocks.The MSCI ACWI ex USA Small Cap Index is an index of global small-cap stocks, excluding the United States.The performance of an index does not represent exactly any particular investment, as you cannot invest directly in an index. Returns for the market indexes used in this report were based on information supplied to Royce by Russell Investments. Royce has not independently verified the above described information.

This material contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”), that involve risks and uncertainties, including, among others, statements as to:

-the Funds’ future operating results,

-the prospects of the Funds’ portfolio companies,

-the impact of investments that the Funds have made or may make, the dependence of the Funds’ future success on the general economy and its impact on the companies and industries in which the Funds invest, and

-the ability of the Funds’ portfolio companies to achieve their objectives.

This discussion uses words such as “anticipates,” “believes,” “expects,” “future,” “intends,” and similar expressions to identify forward-looking statements. Actual results may differ materially from those projected in the forward-looking statements for any reason.

The Royce Funds have based the forward-looking statements included in this commentary on information available to us on the date of the commentary, and we assume no obligation to update any such forward-looking statements. Although The Royce Funds undertake no obligation to revise or update any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events, or otherwise, you are advised to consult any additional disclosures that we may make through future shareholder communications or reports.

This material is not authorized for distribution unless preceded or accompanied by a current prospectus. Please read the prospectus carefully before investing or sending money. Smaller-cap stocks may involve considerably more risk than larger-cap stocks. (Please see “Primary Risks for Fund Investors” in the prospectus.)

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